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MISSOURT LAW REVIEW
INTERLOCAL COOPERATION: THE MISSOURI APPROACH
I. INTRODUcTON
The rapid growth in metropolitan areas has created a problem of adapting
the machinery of local government to fast changing needs., Among the results
of this growth have been the fragmentation of urban governments and over-
lapping and duplication of functions in attempting to meet the demand for more
and better municipal services.2 This fragmentation and overlap have caused un-
acceptable inefficiency and failure to provide the level of services 'needed. The
sociological changes brought about by population growth demand adequate legal
machinery to solve the problems created. Numerous and varied solutions have
been offered.8
A. Attempted Solutions
Among the approaches taken to the solution of urban problems have been
(1) consolidation of all governmental units into one metropolitan-area govern-
ment; (2) annexation of surrounding territory to existing communities; (3) the
creation of special districts to perform specific functions; (4) incorporation of
new communities. 4 No one of these approaches has provided the answer to the
problems of governing the modern metropolitan community of a central city with
its perimeter of burgeoning communities of various sizes and financial capacities.
Furthermore, no single approach is likely to provide the solution.
The metropolitan-wide government has been met by the fear of existing local
governments that they will lose their identity.5 In addition, creation of such new
and large governmental bodies is a slow, long-range process and many immediate
problems of providing needed services to an expanding metropolitan area will not
1. Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, A Handbook for
Interlocal Agreements and Contracts 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ACIR Hand-
book]; Grant, Trends in Urban Government and Administration, 30 LAW AND
CONTrMP. PROB 38, 47-52 (1965); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1966 State Legislative Program 99 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ACIR
Program]; Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations 737 (1964); Owsley, The
Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act, 51 Ky. L. J. 22, 24 (1962).
2. ACIR Handbook, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1; ACIR Program, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 391; Graves, op. cit. supra note 1, at 748; Veselich, Interlocal
Cooperation (Memorandum prepared for the Intergovernmental and Metropolitan
Problems Subcommittee of the Governor's Advisory Council on Local Government
Law) (1967), on file in the office of the Missouri Department of Community
Affairs; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Intergovernmental
Responsibilities for Water Supply and Sewage Disposal in Metropolitan Areas 102
(1962). See also, Salsich, Local Government in Missouri. The Crossroads Reached,
32 Mo. L. REv. 73 (1967), for a good discussion of many of the current problems
of local government.
3. ACIR Handbook, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1.
4. Ibid.
5. National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Report of Committee on
Inter-Municipal Cooperation, 23 MUNic. L. REv. 156 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
NIMLO Report, MUNic. L. REv. - ( )].
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wait.8 The geheral public also exhibits a natural hostility to subordination of the
interests of the smaller community to those of the larger community and any loss
of control over th6 local tax dollar. The growth of suburban political strength
seems to serve to.strengthen opposition to consolidation of local government unitsy
The effects of these obstacles may be seen in the failure of numerous attempts to
initiate programs merging various forms of local government entities into various
forms of metropolitan governments. 8
Annexation was at an early date the most common and probably the most
successful method of controlling the unincorporated fringe of a city.9 It is usually,
however, a slow, cumbersome and expensive process. It also creates further prob-
lems of withdrawal or exclusion of the annexed territory from special districts that
have been providing services.10 And, of course, annexation is no aid to a city that
is completely locked in by other incorporated communities, as is St. Louis, in the
absence of special authority to annex.
The use of either special districts or incorporation to meet the demands of a
metropolitan area for increased services often compounds the problem. Another
governmental body is created with a resulting increase in fragmentation and de-
crease in the uniformity of services provided areawide. This is not true of all
special districts, because many have functioned quite effectively in metropolitan
areas. Metropolitan-wide special districts have been used to great advantage to
provide a single service to an entire region, especially for water supply and sewage
disposal. 1
B. Interlocal Cooperation
Numerous authorities on local government law, as well as many organiza-
tions of governmental officials, advocate interlocal cooperation as one of the best
tools to meet the demands of urbanization. Indeed, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, the National Municipal League, the National Insti-
6. Ibid. See also, NIMLO Report, 28 MUNic. L. Ray. 164 (1965).
7. Grant, supra note 1, at 49, 51; Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide 23, 24
(1963); Presentation by Arthur G. Will to American Association of Law Schools
on Metropolitan Area Problems (date unknown), on file in University of Missouri
at Kansas City School of Law Library.
8. Between 1953 and 1958 there were more than sixty-five attempts in
various states. Only a handful of these programs still exist today and the only
successful attempts to form metropolitan-wide governments have been Miami-Dade
County, Florida and Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee. NIMLO Report,
29 MUNic. L. REv. 199 (1966); Grant, supra note 1, at 48-49.
9. Will, op. cit. supra note 7, at 2; Nickolaus, Annexation in Missouri vi
(1960).
10. Will, op. cit supra note 7, at 3. For another problem in Annexation, see
Comment, Municipal Annexation and Due Process, 10 STAN. L. R. 763 (1958).
11. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 446,
357 P.2d 863 (1960); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, In-
tergovernmental Responsibilities for Water Supply and Sewage Disposal in Metro-
politan Areas 108, 120 (1962).
1968]
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tute of Municipal Law Officers, the Council of State governments and the California
Coordinating Council on Urban Policy all highly recommend the use of cooperative
efforts to attack the problems of local government and urge that states encourage
such undertakings by providing adequate legal authority for interlocal cooperation,
along with technical assistance and guidance. 12
In the last five years alone, a discernible trend has been observed by many
authorities in resolving inter-municipal problems through cooperation among local
governmental bodies.' s State legislative and constitutional reform in recent years
have indicated a growing awareness on the part of state governments of the need
to permit and encourage local solutions to problems through cooperative action.
By 1965 at least forty-five states had adopted general interlocal cooperation
authority to some extent.14 The new Michigan Constitution is a notable example.
It empowers the legislature to authorize local governments to enter into con-
tractual agreements to administer jointly their functions and powers. 15
Interlocal cooperation could be broadly defined as any device by which a
unit of local government undertakes to carry out one or more of its functions
through a contract or agreement, formal or informal. This contract or agreement
might be with another unit of government, a government official, or a government
agency, local, state or federal, or with an individual person, corporation or asso-
ciation.16
12. See generally, ACIR Handbook, op. cit. supra, note 1, at iii; ACIR Pro-
gram, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 357; NIMLO Report, 23 MUNIC. L. REv. 156 (1960);
NIMLO Report, 27 MUNic. L. REV. 148 (1964); NIMLO Report, 28 MUsic. L.
REv. 164 (1965); 29 MUsic. L. REv. 199 (1966); Council of State Governments,
State Responsibilities in Urban Regional Development 104 (1962); Graves, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 770. Mr. Graves, at 778, suggests that interlocal cooperation
is needed in rural government as well as in urban government. He states that
interlocal cooperation would help achieve competence in local administration with-
out consolidation of currently widespread, inefficient units of local governments in
rural areas. This possible need for interlocal agreements has been overshadowed by
the complexities of urban growth, and may, therefore, be less compelling. Never-
theless, interlocal cooperation might solve many problems of rural governments
that do not have the financial capacity to alone provide many needed services.
While no person or organization has contended that interlocal cooperation is
the ultimate solution, many of the above authorities agree that it is the most
flexible, workable and effective method to provide the needed municipal services.
They advocate it as a method that avoids the effort required to overcome public
resistence to change. Yet it does not waste the time that would be required to
completely restructure local government while preserving the maximum of home rule
and local control.
13. ACIR Handbook, op. cit. s pra note 1, at 8; NIMLO Report, 27 MUNIC.
L. REv. 148 (1964); 28 MUNIc. L. Ray. 164, 173 (1965); NIMLO Report, 29
MUNic. L. REv. 199 (1966); Grant, supra note 1; Graves, op. cit. supra note 1, at
737 et seq.
14. ACIR Program, op. cit. supra note 6, at 357.
15. MiCH. CONsT. art. VII, § 28 (1963).
16. The definition is that of this writer. Many narrower definitions may be
found. See ACIR Handbook, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2; Grant, supra note 1;
Graves, op. cit. supra note 1; Owsley, supra note 1; Veselich, op. cit. swpra note 2.
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C. Areas of Cooperation
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations1 7 suggests that
interlocal agreements and contracts could be used for an almost unlimited variety
of functions.18 Numerous studies show that cooperative agreements have been
used successfully to carry out a wide range of functions, such as tax collection,
planning, civil defense, administration of elections, electrical inspection, library
administration, city-county courts, alcoholic rehabilitation, property revaluation,
hospital administration, fire protection, garbage disposal and sewage services, water
supply, police radio, criminal identification, court record maintenance, and con-
struction and maintenance of courthouses and jails.' 9 The Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations considers that cooperative contracting is appropriate
for any commodity type service or proprietary function. It suggests that coopera-
tive contracting is also appropriate for governmental or legislative functions, which
have the characteristics of (1) lack of a requirement of major substantive discre-
tion; (2) standardized and accepted performance methods; (3) a specialized need
for professional or technical qualifications; (4) a comparatively stable demand for
services.20 Any governmental service or function that meets these standards would
likely be appropriate for a municipality to provide through use of a cooperative
service contract.
A "contract for services" is generally distinguished from a "joint agreement,"
both of which are used for cooperative action.2' The distinction is not based on
any difference in the binding legal effect, but on the practical difference in the
operation of the two. An agreement providing for the joint exercise of powers is
generally used when all cooperating units actively participate in carrying out the
activity by membership on a commission or board created to deal with a common
problem. Such an agreement is usually used for activities requiring program develop-
ment and policy decisions, such as recreation, planning and urban renewal.22 On the
other hand, a service contract authorizes the furnishing of a service by one govern-
mental unit to another on a contractual basis. Such contracts are best used to
provide a commodity type service, such as water or sewage, or a standardized
17. The ACIR is a permanent body established by federal legislation in 1959.
5 U.S.C. §§ 2371-2378 (1964); ACIR Program, op. cit. supra note 1, at iii.
18. ACIR Handbook, op. cit. supra note 1, at 8.
19. Id. at 36-51; Graves, op. cit. supra note 1 at 775; and see the bibliography
at NIMLO Report, 27 MuNic. L. Ray. 148, 157 (1964).
20. The proprietary-governmental distinction is not considered by this writer
to be of much significance in determining whether or not a particular function is
appropriate for interlocal cooperation. It is important in that the labels have been
applied by the courts in holding that a local body is empowered to perform a
particular function. This would in turn affect interpretation of the local units
power to contract for the performance of that function. See Westbrook, Municipal
Home Rule, An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33 Mo. L. REv. 45, 47
(1968).
21. ACIR Handbook, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2; Council of State Governments,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 83.
22. ACIR Handbook, op. cit. supra note 1, at 14.
1968]
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technical service, such as police radio or data processing.23 Service contracts over-
come many problems of overlap and fragmentation without attendant problems of
consolidation, because they stress consolidation of services rather than consolida-
tion of governments.
The most widespread use of service contracts has taken place in Los Angeles
County, California. The City of Lakewood is a planned community, which was
built in an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County. When the City was
incorporated in 1954, it contracted with the County for virtually all of its municipal
services. This inaugurated a city-county cooperative program that has been
adopted in twenty-eight subsequent incorporations in Los Angeles County. Under
the program the county will provide municipal-type services to a city at the
same level and cost as provided unincorporated portions of the county. The level of
service can be increased, but the city is required to pay the increased cost 24
II. THE MISSOURi APPROACH
The Missouri Constitution art. VI, § 16 provides:
Any municipality or political subdivision of this state may contract
and cooperate with other municipalities or political subdivisions thereof,
or with other states or their municipalities or political subdivisions, or
with the United States, for the planning, development, construction,
acquisition, or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for a
common service, in the manner provided by law.
Section 70.220, RSMo 1959 states:
Any municipality or political subdivision of this state, as herein de-
fined, may contract and cooperate with any other municipality or political
subdivision, or with an elective or appointive official thereof, or with a duly
authorized agency of the United States, or of this state, or with other states
or their municipalities or political subdivisions, or with any private person,
firm, association or corporation, for the planning, development, construc-
tion, acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for
a common service; provided, that the subject and purposes of any such
contract or cooperative action made and entered into by such municipality
or political subdivision shall be within the scope of the powers of such
municipality or political subdivision.
Section 70.230, RSMo 1959 states:
Any municipality may exercise the power by ordinance duly enacted,
or, if a county, then by order of the county court duly made and entered,
or if other political subdivision, then by resolution of its governing body
or officers made and entered in its journal or minutes of proceedings, which
shall provide the terms agreed upon by the contracting parties to such
contract or cooperative action.
23. rd. A study in St. Louis County in 1964 revealed that the County and
municipal governments located within it have made considerable use of these con-
tracts. The study showed 341 service contracts between cities, towns or villages
and the county during 1964. ACIR Handbook, op cit. su'ra note 1 at 12. See
also, Bollens, Exploring the Metropolitan Community 75 (1961) for a discussion
of the use of service contracts in St. Louis.
24. NIMLO Report, 28 MuNic. L. REv. 164, 168 (1965).
[VOL. 33
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A. Legal Problems In Interloca Cooperation
Many'legal issues and problems are raised by interlocal coopratibl. A few
of themihve" been decided in Missouri indicating some of the types f agree-
ments that will be upheld. This section will: (1) discuss and evaluate some of
those issues and-problems; (2) discuss how a number of them have been ap-
proached in Missouri; (3) discuss how those that have not been raised in Mis-
souri mighi be resolved.
1. Constitutionality of Cooperation Statutes
In a few cases interlocal cooperation statutes have been attacked as violative
of a state constitution. The basis of a claim of unconstitutionality will often depend
on the particular constitutional and statutory provisions existig in the jurisdiction.
Even in jurisdictions with no express constitutional authority for cooperation,
statutes have been upheld against attacks that they interfere with the inherent
right of local self-government; 25 that lack of express constitutional authority is
fatal;20 that a statute authorized that which a constitutional provision prohibited;27
or that a statute.was an unlawful delegation of its power by the legislature28 In
Missouri the interlocal cooperation statute has been upheld, because the Constitution
specifically authorized the legislature to enact it.29
2. Delegation of Powers
Delegation of its powers by one municipality or political subdivision to
another has sometimes been a problem with regard to specific cooperation agree-
ments. Generally, the attempted delegation by a municipality of its "legislative"
powers is not upheld.8 0 On the other hand "administrative" or "ministerial" powers
may be delegated.31 However, some legislative delegations of power are permitted,
if there are adequate standards3 2 Delegation of municipal power should not be a
serious barrier in Missouri to the use of cooperative agreements. In School District
of Kansas City v. Kansas City3s the supreme court upheld an agreement for the
erection of a library building by the School District on a public parkway owned
by the City and under the control of its Park Commissioners. The City contended
that the agreement was an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers of the
25. City of Ecorse v. Peoples Community Hospital Authority, 335 Mich. 490,
58 N.W.2d 159 (1953).
26. Ragsdale v. Hargraves, 129 S.W.2d 967 (Ark. 1939).
27. In Reinhart v. MacGuffie, 19 Pa. D. & C. 594 (1933) a statute authoriz-
ing a county to appropriate funds to a city for building an airstrip was, held not
to be contrary to a constitutional provision prohibiting a county from appropriating
money to any corporation, association, institution or individual.
28. Greggio v. City of Orange, 69 N.J. Super. 453, 174 A.2d-390 (1961).
29. St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis, 239 S.W.2d 289 (Mo.
En Banc 1951). Section 70.220, RSMo 1959, was held to be constitutional, but
no specific basis for the alleged unconstitutionality was given.
30. State v. Eckhardt, 322 S.W2d 903 (Mo. 1959).
31, 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 5.18 (1958).
32. Id. at § 5.19.
33. 382 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
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Park Board. This contention was rejected without regard to the legislative-adminis-
trative dichotomy, because the agreement was found to have been expressly
authorized by the state constitution. The court stated that Article VI, section 16
of the Constitution "in its very nature denoted a division or sharing of that which
is' necessary to achieve the common end."134 This might indicate that a power,
which the court found to be within the powers of the municipality or political
subdivision, could be exercised jointly, regardless of its legislative or adininistra-
tive nature.
3. Traditional Rules of Construction
The traditional approach of construing municipal powers narrowly has had
a serious deterrent effect on the widespread use of interlocal agreements. Gen-
erally, a municipality or other political subdivision is considered to have only
those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by law.3 5 The traditional rule is
that any reasonable doubt as to whether or not a city has a particular power
should be resolved against the existence of the power3 6 The Attorney General
has been steadfast in applying these rules to disapprove proposed agreements.
He has on four occasions rejected a proposed agreement, because he could find
no express authority granting the power that in his opinion was sought to be
exercised jointly. He has held that a county may not contribute funds to a city
to build a shelter house in a city park,37 construct a room in a city hospital,as
or build a sewer system that would be used by and be of benefit to county
residents.3 0 In each of these opinions the Attorney General viewed the power to-
be exercised as appropriation of funds to a city, for which there was no express
authority. This in itself would seem to be inaccurate. The powers to be exercised
were those of providing park facilities, hospital facilities and sewer facilities to
the public. These powers should properly have been considered the subject
matter of the proposed agreements, all of which are within the scope of the
powers of the entities involved. Nevertheless, the traditionally narrow approach
to the construction of municipal powers seems to have affected the Attorney
General's interpretation of the subject matter of the agreements.
In another opinion the Attorney General also invalidated a proposed agree-
ment by a narrow construction of-county powers. He disapproved a proposal for
a county to operate a dumping ground in cooperation with municipalities.
40
34. Id. at 696.
35. King v. Maries County, 297 Mo. 488 (1923); City of St. Ann v. Buschard,
356 S.W.2d 567 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
36. City of Springfield v. Mecum, 320 S.W.2d 742 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959);
State v. Steinbach, 274 S.W2d 588 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
37. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, July 8, 1954, Dale, No. -21.
38. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, March 27, 1957, Moore,
No. 63.
39. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, May 12, 1952, Hibbard,
No. 40.
40. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, May 19, 1964, Volkmer,
No. 140. 7
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There being n.o statute expressly authorizing a county to maintain a dumping
ground, the Attorney General considered such an activity outside the scope of
the powers of the county. There is, however, authority for the county. to acquire
land for the "use and benefit" of the public, and this phrase has beei broadly
construed. 41 A dumping ground to be used as a central depository for trash in
order to control the spread of rubbish should certainly be considered to be for
the use and benefit of the public.
The supreme court, while giving no indication of an intent to abandon the
traditional rules of construction of municipal powers, has offered some encourage-
ment to cooperative agreements. In upholding the agreement discussed above in
School District of Kansas City v. Kansas City42 the court labeled the construc-
tion and operation of a library as the subject matter of the agreement. Following
the reasoning of the Attorney General's opinions just discussed, one might. easily
have concluded that the subject of the agreement in the School District case was
merely the providing of a parcel of land by the City to the School District.
Fortunately, the court considered the ultimate purpose to be accomplished by
the actions of the two bodies, rather than what action each had to take in
accomplishing that purpose, in order to determine the character of the subject
matter. Had the Attorney General done so, he could have reasoned that the
purposes of the agreements involved in his opinions were to build park, hospital
or sewer facilities and that the payment of funds by the county was merely its
obligation under the agreement. For one body to pay for part of a park or
hospital and for the other to build and operate it would seem to have little sub-
stantive effect on their independent powers to operate hospitals and parks. The
activities of the two bodies would certainly be combined to achieve a purpose
thereby, which was within the scope of the powers of both. The Attorney Gen-
eral even acknowledged that both the city and county have power to operate
parks and hospitals. 43
Also in School District of Kansas City v. Kansas City,44 the court engaged
in considerable analysis to determine that the subject matter of the agreement
was within the powers of the City. The School District wisely relied on specific
charter provisions to argue that the City had the necessary power. The court
responded with a broad interpretation of those charter provisions. It is hoped
that this case might be interpreted as an indication that the court will attempt to
uphold useful and important cooperative agreements, 45 construing powers some-
what broadly, if necessary, in order to do so.
41. Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955).
42. 382 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
43. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, March 27, 1957, Moore,
No. 63; Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, May 12, 1952, Hibbard, No.
40.
44. 382 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
45. In St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis, 239 S.W.2d 289, 293
(Mo. En Banc 1951) the Court also recognized the importance of the issues to the
public in upholding the agreement.
19681
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4. Requirement of Equal Powers
.One of the most serious deterrents to flexibility in'interlocal cooperation-is a
limitation that the participants in cooperative activity must have equal or com-
mon powers. The question raised is whether two or more municipalities or political
subdivisi6fts may exercise a power jointly or cooperatively when only one of them
possesse§ it: It might arise in one of two ways.
The firwt possibility is when two or more governmental units have, power to
act in a given functional area, but their powers are not exactly the same. "For
example, irn Missouri, first class cities are empowered to acquire land outside the
city limits for the establishment of a city park and to operate and maintain such
a park.40 Second class cities do not have such a power, but may operate parks
within the city limits.47 If first and second class cities could jointly exercise only
a power, that was exactly equally possessed by both, they could not jointly acquire
the land, ,build and operate a park outside the city limits of the second class
city. Nor could a second class city, establish and operate jointly with the county
in which located a park that was outside the limits of the city, even though the
county also had authority to establish and operate a park.
The second situation in which the question of unequal powers might arise
is when one unit has the power to act in a particular area, but the other unit has
no power whatsoever to act in that area. Suppose, for example, thai the second
class city had been given no authority by law to operate a park. Could it then
jointly establish and maintain a park within its city limits with a city that was
so empowered? The phrase, "unequal powers," as used here is intended to include
both of the above situations.
Most interlocal cooperation statutes state expressly or have been interpreted
to mean that equal powers are required.48 While the Missouri statute does not
expressly limit co6peration to equal powers, that is apparently the situation.
In the two leading cases of St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis49 and
School District of Kansas City v. Kansas City"° the subject matter of the agree-
ments involved were held to be within the scope of the powers of the parties to
the agreements. The agreements were held valid, because each provision was
46. § 90.070, RSMo 1959.
47. § 90.550, RSMo 1959.
48. Mandelker, Managing Our Urban Environment 364-365. Section 471.59
(1) MiNN. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1965) authorizes cooperation between two gov-
ernmental units of any "power common to them." Indiana and Kentucky have
both adopted statutes based on legislation proposed by the Council of State
Governments, which has stated that "the act permits two or more localities to
exercise a power jointly or cooperatively if only one of them possess it." Council
of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957 (1956). But
see Owsley, supra note 1, at 31, 32, where the author concludes that the Kentucky
act would not permit the joint exercise of a power held by only one of the parties.
His conclusion is based on a lack of any indication that the legislature so. intended
and the; history of Kentucky courts in applying strict rules of construction of
municipal powers.
49. 239 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. En Banc 1951).
50. 328 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. En Banc f964).
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within the scope of powers of the parties. Thetefoi, the cases carry-'a strong impli-
cation, that .-the court would have invalidated any provision. -in the agreements
that it -found to be within the power, or-authority of one-,party, but-.not the
othe'r.'Furthernfiore, in School District of KXasas City the -court -;quoted from a
California -case, which construed- a statute: similar -to, section 70.220, -.RSMo, 1959,
in which the California Supreme Court referred to powers "which each independ-
ently could* have exercised or performed." 5' And in St. Louis Housing, Authority
the court added italicized emphasis to the proviso of the Missouri statute that
requires that the subject and purpose of cooperatives entered into by a municipality
"shall be- within the scope of the powers' of such municipality or political 'sub-
division."52  
,
The language -of the above-quoted part of section 70.220, RSMo 1959, does
seem clear enough to preclude a municipality or political subdivision from engaging
in activity outside its "scope of powers," even though another body with which
it was cooperating possessed the power. It is suggested, however, thai'a reasonable
construction could be given the statute that would permit the joint, exercise of
unequal powers as long as all parties to the agreement had the power to engage
in some activity in the area that was the subject and purpose of the cooperative
action. That would be such a case as that first described at the beginning of this
sub-section, When both governmental units have power to act in a given area,
but not to the same extent. An act not expressly authorized for it might be
considered to be within the "scope of the powers" of the unit with the lesser degree
of authority in that given area. The issue has not been raised in either a,case or an
Attorney General's opinion.
5. Unconstrued Statutory Language
As is the case with most statutes, the problem of the meaning of statutory
language manifests itself in cooperation statutes. Missouri is no exception.
The words "municipality" and "political subdivision" should cause little
difficulty. Municipality has been held to be interchangeable with "municipal
corporation" and has been broadly construed. 53 Political subdivision is defined
by the statute.54
51. 382 S.W.2d at 696. The court quoted from City of 'Oakland v. Williams,
15 Cal.2d 542, 103 P.2d 168 (1940), saying that the California statute on inter-
local cooperation is similar to Missouri's constitutional provision. Actially, the
restrictive nature of that statute was clearer than Missouri's. It states that ,munici-
palities may jointly exercise by agreement "any power or powers common to
them." The California Supreme Court, however, took the common sense approach
that all possible conflicting charter provisions of the cities involved in the agreement
could not be made relevant or the effect would be to vitiate the statute and
make nearly all attempted agreements impossible.
52. 239 S.W.2d at 293.
53. St. Louis Housing v. City of St. Louis, 239 S.W.2d 289, 295-6 (Mo. En
Banc 1951). A housing authority was held to be a municipal corporation within
the meaning of the cooperation statute in this case, also. Cf. Schmoll v. Housing
Authority of St. L. County, 321 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1959).
54. § 70.210, RSMo 1959.
1968 -o
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Other words that might raise questions in particular situations are "public
improvement or facility" and "common service," the things for which cooperation
is authorized. Whether or not a state or federal agency is "duly authorized" might
also raise a question.
The Attorney General has added a word to the statute. He has defined
"common service" as common "public" service.5 5 In so doing he held -that a
county could not use its road equipment on private roads, even though it was to
be compensated for the work. He did not consider the fact that the revenues
derived therefrom would be for a public purpose. He merely saw the private
benefit to be received by the owners of the road as antagonistic to the public
nature of section 70.220, RSMo 1959.
Although "public improvement" and "public facility" have not been con-
strued within the meaning of the statute, property has been determined to be for
"public 'use" when it is used for the benefit of any "considerable" number of
memijbers of the community.58 The same definition could apply to "public improve-
ment 'or facility" within the meaning of the cooperation statute.
The Attorney General has also held that the Highway Patrol is not a "duly
authorized" agency to enter into a contract with a city for common police serv-
ices.5 7 He did not, however, make clear 'what would be required for the Highway
Patrol to become "duly authorized." He did state that the authority would have
to come from the legislature, but he did not define the phrase. If "duly authorized"
means authorized to perform a particular function, it would seem that such a
contract should be good. This would require an interpretation that authority to
contract comes from the cooperation statute. If so, then the Highway Patrol
should be able to contract with a city to provide police services, because highway
patrolmen are authorized by statute to act within a city and assist the city
policemen.58 If, on the other hand, "duly authorized" means authorized to
contract, other specific statutory authorization would be required for the state
agency to be able to execute the contract.5
55. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, December 9, 1966, Evans,
No. 14.
56. Arata v. Monsanto Chemical Company, 351 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. 1961).
The court also said, at 721, "Nor does the mere fact that the advantage of a
public improvement also inures to a particular individual or group of individuals
deprive it of its public character."
57. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, November 4, 1963, Avery,
No. 258.
58. § 43.180, RSMo 1959.
59.- Nor is it clear whether the Attorney General was talking about authoriza-
tion to contract in general, or for the specific purpose in question. The problem is
that the opinion did not answer the question asked. The inquiry had been whether
a city policeman could act outside the limits of his city by virtue of, a contract
with the Highway Patrol. The real issue, therefore, was not whether the Highway
Patrol was empowered to contract in regard to a function (law enforcement) that
it had the power to perform. The question actually, if the Highway Patrol -could
so contract, was whether the purpose of the contract was within the scope of the
powers of the city. Furthermore, if the cooperation statute requires that all coop-
erating parties have equal spheres of power, then other problems are presented.
[Vol. 33
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6. Limitations on the Joint Entity
What kind of separate entity may participants create to carry out their
cooperative activity. Section 70.260, RSMo 1959, provides for the establishment
of a "board, commission, officer or officers" to manage any contract or cooperative
action contemplated by the cooperation statute. In some cases the constitutional
status of persons serving on such a board or commission while administratively
attached to some other governmental unit has been a question.60 In Missouri the
state auditor, secretary of state and state treasurer may have no duties imposed
on them by law that do not relate to the duties prescribed by the state constitu-
tion.61 Therefore, one of these officers could not constitutionally be named to a
cooperative board not relating to their constitutional duties, created by agreement
between the state and a city, for example, by an act of the legislature. Beyond
that, there appear to be no constitutional barriers to other public officers serving
on a cooperative board or commission. 62
Another question in regard to a board or commission created for cooperative
activity is its financial power. The state constitution limits the amount of debt
that a municipal corporation or political subdivision may incur.63 Can a joint
commission incur debt that would in effect extend the debt limit of the par-
ticipants? An "authority" created pursuant to enabling legislation to construct
and maintain a joint city-county office building has been allowed to independently
incur debt. However, the enabling act provided the "authority" with broad,
general corporate powers including the issuance of revenue bonds. The bonds could
be paid only from the revenues derived from the building. Therefore, the "au-
thority" was held not to be an illusory scheme, designed merely to extend the
debt limitations of the city and county, but a separate entity that could itself
incur debt up to the constitutional limit.
It does not seem likely that a board or commission as authorized by sections
70.220 and 70.260, RSMo 1959, would have any independent power to incur debt.
Section 70.250, RSMo 1959, provides that a cooperative activity be financed
"in the manner and by the same procedure for the financing by such municipality
or political subdivision . . . if acting alone . . . ... Therefore, unless a board or
commission itself reached the status of a municipal corporation or political sub-
division within the meaning of the constitution, it undoubtedly could not be used
to extend the debt limitation of a municipality.
The law enforcement powers of policemen differ for each class of city. For example,
police officers of first class cities are officers of the state. § 85.190, RSMo 1959.
Those of second, third and fourth class cities are not. §§ 85.340, 85.561, 85.610,
RSMo 1959. Therefore, the inquiry should have been into the particular purpose
sought to be achieved by the contract.
60. ACIR Program, op. cit. supra note 1, at 387.
61. Mo. CONST. art 4, §§ 13, 14, 15.
62. See Mo. CoNsT. art VII. The framers of the Michigan Constitution of
1963 took care of this problem by a specific:provision that any public official, ex-
cept legislators, may serve on any body established for the purpose of inte'rlocal
cooperation. MicH. CONsT. art. VII, § 27. ,
63. Mo. CONST. art. 6, §§ 26(a), 26(b).
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7.' Binding Successor Bodies
The question has arisen as to how long a period the governing* botly of a
municipality may contract. Contracts which a municipality is authorized to make
lre governed by normal principles of contract. 4 The same standards of reasonable-
ness apply and the same considerations determine their validity and effect.6 5
Although there appear to be no Missouri cases on the point, governing bodies of
municipalities are considered continuing bodies without regard to change in per-
sonnel.0 0 They can bind their successors by contract and an interlocal cooperation
contract should be treated no differently. A cooperative contract to be in force as
long as fifty years has been upheld elsewhere as reasonable and not unconstitu-
tionally binding a successor body.
8. Procedural Requirements for Cooperative Action
A failure to comply with procedural requirements will be fatal to the validity
of a cooperative agreement.67 In Schnoll v. Housing Autolity of St. Louis
County68 the supreme court held that the procedural requirement of a charter
provision superseded the procedural requirements of the statutes. The county
charter required approval of a cooperative agreement by ordinance, but the agree-
ment in question had been adopted only by resolution.69 The opinion raised the
question of whether a constitutional charter body must find power to cooperate
in its charter, regardless of other constitutional or statutory authority, because the
court said that the county "is obliged to look to the charter for its powers .... !
Somewhat ambiguously, the court seemed to say that the county had no power
to make the agreement merely because the statute provided for cooperation. The
question was later answered when the court held that a charter apparently having
no cooperation provision did not preclude a city from entering into a cooperation
agreement, because authority to do so was derived from the constitution and
statutes, which prevail in conflicts with the charter "in regard to matters of
statewide concern and governmental functions." 70
As the supreme court did in &kncroll, the Attorney General seems to confuse
questions of power with questions of procedure. In his opinions denying the
64. "Contracts made by the city, if authorized, are just like other contracts.
They are measured by the same tests and are subject to the same rights and
liabilities." State v. Kansas City, 4 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Mo. En Banc 1928).
65. Beverly Sewage Authority v. Delanco Sewage Authority, 167 A.2d 46
(N. J. 1961),
66. Town of Graham v. Karpak Corp., 194 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1952); Denio
v. City of Huntington Beach, 140 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1943).
67. Schmoll v. Housing of St. Louis County, 321 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1959).
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. School District of Kansas City v. Kansas City, 382 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. En
Banc 1964). At page 693 the court distinguished Sckinww and, it is submitted,
properly so. The court said that the question in Schmoll was not really one of
whether or not the county was endowed with the power, but a questiofn of a failure
to follow the correct procedure in exercise of the power.
[V61.- 33
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contribution of county funds to a city for park and hospital construction 71 he
found no power for a county to do so, but stated that the cooperation statutes
provided a "method" by which the county could take part in such activity. As
stated previously, the county should be able to cooperate with the city in these
projects by any method, even by contributing funds, so Iong as the procedural
steps required by statute are followed:. Such an interpretation would. mean that a
county does have the power to contribute funds to a city for park and hospital
constiuction.Y2
The procedural steps are few.' Section 70.230, RSMo 1959, set out above,
merely requires that the action taken to enter into an agreement be the same as that
which would be required for the municipality or political subdivision to take in
order to undertake an activity alone. If the body involved is a political sub-
division,73 then a majority vote of its governing board is required for approval
of any contract.74 If the power of cooperation is exercised by contract, executed
by a political subdivision, the contract must be in writing and filed with the
secretary of state and county recorder.' 5 Nothing else appears to be required
to validly create a cooperative contract or engage in cooperative activity in the
way of procedural prerequisites."6 Therefore, the particular form or content of an
agreement should have little effect on the validity of the agreement, if the
above steps have been taken, so long as the subject matter is proper. 7
9. Other Problems
There are numerous other problems which could be mentioned. For example,
can two political subdivisions acquire and hold real property as tenants in com-
mon for cooperative use? Section 70.240, RSMo 1959, expressly provides that they
may do so. The Attorney General has approved the joint ownership of a library
by a city and county on the basis of this statute.Y8
71. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, July 8, 1954, Dale, No. 21;
Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, March 27, 1957, Moore, No. 63.
72. Ordinance, order of the county court, resolution, etc.
73. Defined by § 70.210, RSMo 1959.
74. § 70.300, RSMo 1959.
75. Ibid. This could raise the question of whether the filing requirement is a
condition precedent to the validity of the contract. The statute does not state
expressly that it is.
76. As previously mentioned, funds must be appropriated for joint action
m the same manner that the participants would appropriate funds for singular
activity. § 70.250, RSMo 1959.
77. In Everett v. County of Clinton, 287 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1959) the court
implied that the parties should specify that joint action is pursuant to §§ 70.210-
70.325, RSMo 1959. It stated, at 38, that the record disclosed no effort on the part of
the parties to comply with these statutes. It is submitted that joint action adopted in
a legal manner by each participant should be valid under § 70.220, even though
the parties never heard of the statute.
78. Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, June 16, 1967, O'Halloran,
No. 141. Section 70.270, RSMo 1959, states that sovereignty shall be retained over
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Under some cooperation statutes, the question has arisen as to whether
cooperative agreements may cross state lines.7 9 Section 70.220, RSMo 1959, per-
mits this by authorizing cooperation with "other states or their municipalities or
p6litical subdivisions ... ." The Missouri statutes do not give agreements crossing
state lines the statuis of interstate compacts.80
What is the effect of extraterritorial limitations on interlocal cooperation?
Generally, a municipality is deemed to have no extraterritorial powers in absence
of statutory authority to act outside its boundaries.81 Logically, it would seem
that interlocal cooperation should be a sweeping exception to that traditional rule.
Otherwise, strict application of the rule could conceivably prevent two or more
political subdivisions from engaging in any cooperative activity, unless their
boundaries were coterminous. Obviously, such a rule cannot be strictly applied
to service contracts where one municipality provides a service to another, such
as water, police, or garbage disposal 82 The expenditure of funds through a co-
operative agreement outside the territorial limits of a municipality is not con-
sidered to be a violation of a constitutional prohibition against the gift of public
funds.8 3
There has been no attempt here to cover all possible problems in interlocal
cooperation. Some of those which this writer considers to be important have been
discussed. No doubt, others will arise that have not yet been conceived. However,
the problems discussed above indicate some of the many difficulties that have been
met in attempts to use the power granted by cooperation statutes.84
79. ACIR Handbook 7 (1967).
80. The Hawaii and Alaska constitutions limit intergovernmental agreements
to interstate compacts. The consent of Congress could be necessary for interstate
compacts to be effective. The Federal Housing Act specifically approves interstate
compacts for urban planning and urban projects. 40 U.S.C. § 461(f) (1964).
81. City of Sedalia v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1936).
See also, Rhyne, Mitnicipal Law 310 (1957) and Annot. 169 ALR 569 (1946).
82. Health problems know no territorial boundaries. Johnson v. City of
Louisville, 261 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1953). Where a municipality has no power to
engage in certain activity that would involve something other than providing a
functional service to another body, the question could be different. For example, a
city with no power to maintain a park outside the city limits in the example given
in the text in sub-section 4 of this section might be required to receive express
authority to operate such a park. Whereas, a city with power to operate water-
works to supply its inhabitants with water should have authority beyond the cooper-
ation statute to be able to contract to supply water to another municipality.
83. City of Oakland v. Williams, 15 Cal.2d 542, 103 P.2d 168 (1940).
84. The Attorney General has not disapproved all cooperative proposals sub-
mitted to him for opinion. In approving proposed agreements, he has held: (1)
that a drainage district may enter into an agreement with the federal government
for assistance in a program of flood control and water use for agriculture, Opinion
of the Attorney General of Missouri, March 24, 1955, Decoster, No. 22; (2) that
the City of St. Louis could bind itself to provide land, easements and rights of way
without cost to the federal government and hold harmless the federal government
in a flood control project through a contract, Opinion of the Attorney General of
Missouri, July 3, 1957, Geary, No. 32; (3) that three counties, one second class
and two third class, could contract with a private planning agency, Opinion of
the Attorney General of Missouri, May 29, 1958, Gibson, No. 33;. (4) that two
[Vol. 33
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III. IMPROYING STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR COOPERATION IN MISSOURI
Although the Missouri statute authorizing interlocal cooperation has been
hailed as a "far-reaching statute,"85 there are areas for improvement which would
encourage the use and increase the flexibility of interlocal cooperation. Statutory
revision should be proposed to overcome the deterrent effects of the traditional
rules of strict construction of municipal powers and some of the other problems
discussed in the previous section8 6 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations [hereinafter cited as ACIR] and the National Municipal League have
both taken a firm stand against traditional rules of construction. These groups
recommend a state constitutional provision that would grant to local governments
"all residual functional powers" not denied by the constitution or 'by general
law.87 However, under present statutory and constitutional powers changes could
be made iri the Missouri enabling legislation that would provide local governments
with greater flexibility to approach problems through interlocal cooperation.
Model legislation proposed by the ACIR in the area of interlocal cooperation
provides the basis for several suggested improvements. The ACIR model coopera-
or more townships may jointly build one nursing home to serve their townshipsjointly, Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, August 28, 1959, Colley, No.
18; (5) that two or more municipalities could cooperate in an industrial develqp-
ment project through the use of municipal bonds, Opinion of the Attorney General
of Missouri, December 24, 1963, Schneider, No. 318; (6) that a metropolitan plan-
ning commission created by a city and county may contract with a state agency,
Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, August 6, 1965, Mitchell, No. 186;(7) that school districts may contract and cooperate with the federal government
in educational assistance programs, Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri,
January 18, 1966, Hearnes, No. 100. Cf., as to junior college districts, Opinion
of Attorney General of Missouri, April 26, 1966, Hearnes, No. 239; (8) that a
county may enter into contracts with third and fourth class cities to collect the
county's real property taxes, Opinion of the Attorney General of Missouri, March
29, 1966, Holman, No. 230; (9) that two municipalities may contract with one
another to furnish police services (but not municipal judicial services), Opinion
of the Attorney General of Missouri, May 15, 1963, Cantrell, No. 213. These
proposals all involved activity, which in this writer's opinion, were rather clearly
within the scope of the powers of the municipalities proposing the agreements.
85. NIMLO Report, 27 MUNIc. L. REv. 148, 151 (1964).
86. Rhyne, Mnicipal Law 310 (1957). "The general rule is that municipal
corporations are creatures of the law and have no powers other than those ex-
pressly or impliedly granted to them by law." City of St. Ann v. Buschard, 356
S.W.2d 567, 574 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962). "Any reasonable doubt as to whether or
not a city has been delegated a certain power should be resolved against the city."
City of Springfield v. Mecum, 320 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959). "As to
the powers of a municipal corporation, we stated . . . that such a corporation was
but a creature or political subdivision of the State, possessing such powers as are
conferred upon it by express or implied provisions of law and with any reasonable
doubt as to whether it has the power resolved against it." State v. Steinback,
274 S.W.2d 588, 590 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955). A restrictive view of municipal
powers is also applied by the rule discussed earlier that "so far as governmental
functions are concerned, it is elementary that a municipal corporation has no
extraterritorial powers." City of Sedalia v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81-.F.2d 193(8th Cir..1936). See also Rhyne, op. cit. supra, at 324.
87. ACIR Program 385, 386 (1965).
1968]
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tion acc.ificludes,.the characteristics that 'it has- found to be the T6st'de'sirabileio
enable local, governments to take full advantage of cooperative -agteennts.88 9
The ACIR recommends* broad, general enabling legislation that 6uld i~ermit
cooperative action to carry out any local governmental ftin~ctioh. The "'Missouri
statute .is relatively broad as compared to statutory authority in 8iheo'r tat'es.s 9
It, permits cooperation for the "planning, development, construction, 'acquisition,
or operation of hny public improvement or facility, or for a commin-service." 90
However, the broader language of the ACIR proposal, "Any po*edf or"p6wers,
privileges or; authority exercised or capable of exercise" 9' would elimiiate -many
of the potential problems of construction of statutory language discussed earlier.02
The model cooperation act suggests language to make possible th6' joint exer-
cise of a power held by only one of the participants.93 It is this Writer's opinion
that such a provision is desirable and would facilitate interlocal cooperatibn. There
are numerous examples in the Missouri statutes of grants of unequal powers among
the various classes of cities.94 They create unnecessary barriers to effective cooper-
ation in many of the functional areas in which local governments operate. Statutory
authorization for the joint exercise of a power possessed by one of the- participating
units of government would make a substantial contribution to the weakening of
those barriers.
To avoid any potential problems, the cooperation statute should be changed
to specify the extent to which a governing body can bind its successors. This
is especially true, since there has been no Missouri holding on this issue. The ACIR
88. Id. at 401-406.
89. A list of the types of statutory authority existing in thirty-five states
may be found in NIMLO Report, 23 MuNIc. L. REv. 156-189 (1960).
90. § 70.220, RSMo 1959.
91. ACIR Program, op. cit. .upra note 87, at 401.
92. The ACIR recommends that the enabling statute also be broad enough
to preclude any problems of conflict with other statutes that confer specific,
as opposed to general, authority to cooperate. For example, there is other constitu-
tional and statutory authority for cooperation in Missouri. Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 14
specifically authorizes counties to jointly perform any common function or service.
Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c) is a special authorization for charter counties to specify
terms upon which they will perform services or functions of a municipality in the
county, when accepted by the voters of the municipality. Sections 70.010 through
70.090, RSMo 1959, are enabling statutes enacted pursuant to Art. VI, § 14 of the
Constitution and they authorize cooperation among counties under certain circum-
stances. These sections could conceivably raise questions as to whether they were
exclusive grants of authority to counties for cooperation. Since § 70.210 includes
county in the definition of political subdivision, these sections are probably unneces-
sary and redundant and should be repealed to avoid any possibility of conflict. The
only exceptions to this recommendation are §§ 70.020 and 70.070, which grant peti-
tioning voters the right to a special election on the question of participation in or
withdrawal from a joint activity. This procedure retains for the people- the oppor-
tunity to maintain some control over and identity with their local government
without sacrificing the advantages of interlocal cooperation.
93. ACIR Program, op. cit. supra note 87, at 401-402.
94. For a brief discussion of the unjustifiable and ridiculous differences in
statutory grants of powers to cities of different classes, see Salsich, Local Govern-
ment in Missouri: The Crossroads Reached, 32 Mo. L. REV. 73 (1967).
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modet act would require as a mandatory provision in any agreement the specifi-
cation of the agreemenes duration.95 This is probably a good approach, because
it retains some flexibility for the parties. Other interlocal cooperation authoriza-
tions have.limited the duration of an agreement to a specified number of years.96
The ACIR also recommends that the statute give to agreements that cross state
lines the effect of interstate compacts. The suggested legislation would make the
state a nominal party to all agreements crossing state lines.97 Such a provision
should.be given consideration. It would be desirable to bind the states involved
and could become .particularly important in matters such as air and water pollution
agreements. It might be helpful to include in the provision a requirement that
the means of terminating any such agreement be specified therein, because of the
possible difficulties in withdrawing from interstate compacts.
The model cooperation act contains more technical prerequisites to the crea-
tion of a. valid agreement than do the Missouri statutes.9 s Filing a proposed agree-
ment with the attorney general for approval is a precondition to its validity.99
The attorney general is to review the proposed agreement and determine that it
complies with the conditions set by the act and with the laws of the state. In
view of the narrow approach to cooperative action taken by the Attorney General
of Missouri,100 such a provision would not presently be desirable. If, however, the
broader enabling act suggested by the ACIR were adopted and some of the prob-
lems of construction eliminated thereby, prior state approval of agreements could
be helpful. Such approval would help to insure the parties and others who might
be interested of the legality of the agreement and might discourage opponents
from litigating its validity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Missouri was one of the earliest states to adopt constitutional and
statutory authorization for interlocal cooperation,' 0 1 the use of the authority granted
does not appear to be nearly as widespread as it should be to aid the problems
of local government.' 02 Furthermore, the continued growth of special districts,
voluntary associations and regional planning seems to contemplate the continued
existence of governmental fragmentation.' 0 3 Meanwhile, the need and desire for
95. ACIR Program, op. cit. s-upra note 87, at 402.
96. Georgia limits agreements to fifty years duration. GA. CONsT. art. VII,
§VI.
97. ACIR Program, op. cit. supra, note 87, at 404.
98. Id. at 403.
99.- Ibid.
100. See text, Pt. IIIA3, supra.
101., Both the Constitution and antecedent of § 70.220, RSMo 1959, were
adopted in 1945. California adopted constitutional provisions in 1922 and Georgia
in 1941.
102. Mohler, Comment on Title Vi1, Cities, Towns and Villages, 5 V.A.M.S.
xxxiii (1952).
103. Grant,, Trends in Urban Government and Administration, 30 LAW AND
CoNTmP. Pnoi. 38, 47-52 (1965).
1968],:-,
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expanded municipal service continues to increase with fewer and fewer individual
local governmental units able to provide them alone, both in the rural -and
metropolitan areas. 104
Interlocal cooperation has many advantages and is one of the best ways for
local governments to approach the problems created by a fragmented local govern-
ment structure. Interlocal agreements can be used to increase efficiency and
economy in many areas, such as centralized purchasing. Joint purchasing alone has
been shown to result in as much as a fourteen per cent savings to a large
metropolitan government.105
Cooperative agreements may also be useful to smaller cities. A good example
of this is the Mid-Missouri Mutual Police Agreement. It provides for a pool of
police equipment and personnel that is available in case of major .disorder or
disaster to any of the five participating cities. Each city bears its own cost of
responding to a call. Therefore, an emergency police force is available to any of
the participants at practically no additional maintenance cost 06 ,*
Interlocal cooperation can provide efficient solutions to many urban problems
that are beyond the individual ability of local entities. The consolidation of
services will result not only in economy, but in the ability of local governments
to meet the demands for such service while still maintaining a maximum of home
rule prerogative and local control.'07
The present Missouri approach to interlocal cooperation does not sufficiently
encourage the use of cooperative action to solve problems of local 'government.
Statutory authority for interlocal cooperation should be broadened to include
any power or function that a local entity possesses. One broad, comprehensive
statute should be adopted and all redundant or conflicting authorizations directed
to specific entities or functions should be eliminated. Authority should be adopted
permitting the exercise of a power possessed by any one of the participating
governmental bodies, unless expressly prohibited by statute to be so jointly exer-
cised. These are the most important revisions needed now. Other features of the
ACIR suggested legislation, which are not provided by the Missouri statutes,
should also be adopted, if Missouri is going to provide its local governments and
officials with the legal machinery to cope with the complex problems of managing
its municipalities.
Of course, statutory reform can only provide the necessary flexibility and
legal machinery to do the job. It cannot overcome public concern over increased
cost and natural public inertia in opposition to change, both of which attend any
efforts to institute new governmental programs. There must be a greater aware-
ness of local governmental officials that interlocal cooperation is an immediate and
effective means available to them to meet the demands of the growing public. The
general citizenry must also be indoctrinated with the fact that uniformity of munici-
104. Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations 737, 770 (1964).
105. Nations Cities, July 1965.
106. NIMLO Report, 29 MUNIC. L. REv. 199, 2034 (1966).
107. NIMLO Report, 28 MUNIc. L REy. 164, 174 (1965). 19
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pal services can no longer be maintained by several agencies within one area and
that the price of autonomous local representation is going to be greater consolidation
of service agencies or greatly increased cost to maintain the level of the services
they desire.
WENDELL E. KoEmR , Ja.
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